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Abstract—We construct a new secret-key assisted polar coding
scheme for private classical communication over a quantum
or classical wiretap channel. The security of our scheme rests
on an entropic uncertainty relation, in addition to the channel
polarization effect. Our scheme achieves the symmetric private
information rate by synthesizing “amplitude” and “phase” chan-
nels from an arbitrary quantum wiretap channel. We find that
the secret-key consumption rate of the scheme vanishes for an
arbitrary degradable quantum wiretap channel. Furthermore, we
provide an additional sufficient condition for when the secret key
rate vanishes, and we suspect that satisfying this condition implies
that the scheme requires no secret key at all. Thus, this latter
condition addresses an open question from the Mahdavifar-Vardy
scheme [1] for polar coding over a classical wiretap channel.
Polar coding is one of the most exciting recent developments
in coding and information theory [2]. The codes are based
on the channel polarization effect and are provably capacity-
achieving with an O (N logN) complexity for both encoding
and decoding, where N is the number of channel uses.
Several researchers have now extended the polar coding
method to a variety of scenarios, one of which includes the
secure transmission of classical data over a wiretap channel
[1]. The polar codes constructed in Ref. [1] meet a “strong
security” criterion, which requires that the mutual information
between the sender’s information bits and the wiretapper’s
channel outputs decrease to zero as N → ∞. Guha and
Wilde later exploited the ideas from Refs. [1], [3] to construct
polar codes for private data transmission over a quantum
wiretap channel [4], and the resulting codes achieve the
symmetric private information rate whenever the channel to
the wiretapper is classical.
An important question left open from Ref. [1] is to deter-
mine if it is possible for the Mahdavifar-Vardy polar coding
scheme to be both reliable and strongly secure. Ref. [4]
made partial progress on this question by suggesting a simple
solution: just allow for the sender and receiver to share
some secret key before communication begins. In spite of
its simplicity, this solution is undesirable from a practical
perspective because it might be difficult for the sender and
receiver to establish good secret key in the first place. Though,
Proposition 22 in Ref. [1] proves that the rate of secret key
needed vanishes if the wiretap channel is degradable.
In this paper, we construct a new polar coding scheme
for private classical communication over a quantum wiretap
channel. As classical wiretap channels are special cases of
quantum wiretap channels, all of our results here apply to
them as well. The security of our scheme has a physical
basis, due to an entropic uncertainty relation [5]. In fact,
our scheme is secure in the strongest information-theoretic
sense, against a wiretapper who has access to unbounded
quantum computational power. The new scheme offers several
improvements over the schemes from Refs. [1], [4]:
• The net rate of private classical communication is equal to
symmetric private information for an arbitrary quantum
channel with qubit input.
• The secret key consumption rate vanishes for an arbitrary
degradable quantum wiretap channel.
• We provide an additional sufficient condition for when
the secret key rate of our polar coding scheme vanishes
(it is based on that in Ref. [6]—we suspect that satisfying
this condition means the code does not require any secret
key bits at all). Since our results here apply to classical
wiretap channels as well, this result addresses the open
question from Ref. [1]. We show that the condition is
satisfied for some example channels (including the one
from Ref. [1]) for a wide range of interesting parameters.
We begin in the next section with some notation and defi-
nitions. Section II overviews our private polar coding scheme
and proves that it is both reliable and secure if sufficient secret
key is available. Section III proves that the rate of secret key
vanishes if the quantum wiretap channel is degradable, and
the same section provides an additional sufficient condition for
when the secret key rate of the polar coding scheme vanishes.
Finally, we conclude in Section IV with a summary.
I. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
A binary-input classical-quantum (cq) channel W : x→ ρx
prepares a quantum state ρx at the output, depending on an
input classical bit x. Two parameters that determine the per-
formance of W are the fidelity F (W ) ≡ ∥∥√ρ0√ρ1∥∥21 and the
symmetric Holevo information I (W ) ≡ H ((ρ0 + ρ1) /2) −
[H (ρ0) +H (ρ1)] /2 where H (σ) ≡ −Tr{σ log2 σ} is the
von Neumann entropy. These parameters generalize the Bhat-
tacharya parameter and the symmetric mutual information [2],
respectively, and are related as I (W ) ≈ 1⇔ F (W ) ≈ 0 and
I (W ) ≈ 0⇔ F (W ) ≈ 1 [3]. The channel W is near perfect
when I (W ) ≈ 1 and near useless when I (W ) ≈ 0.
II. PRIVATE POLAR CODING SCHEME
A. Classical-quantum channels for complementary variables
Consider a quantum wiretap channel NA′→BE [7], [8]
with a qubit input system A′ for the sender Alice, an output
system B for the legitimate receiver Bob, and an output
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system E for the wiretapper Eve. The channel NA′→B from
the sender to the legitimate receiver arises by tracing over
the wiretapper’s system: NA′→B (ρ) ≡ TrE{NA′→BE (ρ)},
where ρ is some qubit input to the channel. Let UA
′→BES2
N
denote an isometric extension of this channel [9], such that
S2 is its environment. The system S2 is known as a “shield”
system [10], [11], which is not available to the wiretapper and
may or may not be available to the legitimate receiver. The
security of our scheme is in part based on the fact that this
shield system is not available to the wiretapper.
This quantum wiretap channel NA′→BE captures the case
in which the wiretapper has access to all the physical degrees
of freedom that are not available to the legitimate receiver (so
that S2 is a trivial system in this case). It also captures the
more specialized case in which the output systems B and E
are classical systems (as in the classical wiretap channel [12]).
(See Appendix A for a brief discussion of this latter point.)
Following Ref. [13], we can produce a protocol for sending
classical information privately over the quantum wiretap chan-
nel NA′→BE by considering two different complementary
channels arising from it. Both of these derived channels are cq
channels that have a classical input bit and a quantum output
depending on this input bit.
The first channel that we consider has Alice prepare a
quantum state ρA
′
z depending on the value of an input bit z.
She then feeds this state into the channel NA′→B :
WA,B : z → NA′→B(ρA′z ). (1)
We call the above channel the “amplitude cq channel,” and the
notation WA,B indicates that it is an amplitude (A) channel
to Bob (B). The state ρA
′
z can generally be a mixed state,
as would arise, for instance, from using randomness at the
encoder. It thus admits a purification |ψz〉A
′S1 , which is some
pure state on a larger tensor-product Hilbert space HA′⊗HS1
such that tracing over the purifying system S1 gives back the
original state: ρA
′
z = TrS1{|ψz〉 〈ψz|A
′S1}. The system S1 is an
additional shield system because it represents another system
that is not available to the wiretapper (though in this case,
Alice always has access to this shield system). By purifying all
systems, we can see that the amplitude channel in (1) arises by
tracing over the S1S2E systems of the following cq channel:
z → |ψz〉BES1S2 ≡ UA
′→BES2
N |ψz〉A
′S1 . (2)
The symmetric Holevo information of this amplitude channel
WA,B is equal to I (WA,B) ≡ I (Z;B)ξ, where the mutual
information I (Z;B) is computed with respect to
ξZBE ≡ 1
2
∑
z
|z〉 〈z|Z ⊗NA′→BE(ρA′z ). (3)
The second cq channel that we consider is a phase channel
with quantum side information (QSI). Suppose now that Alice
has access to an entangled state of the following form:
|ϕ〉CA′S1 ≡ 1√
2
∑
z
|z〉C |ψz〉A
′S1 . (4)
If so, Alice could then modulate the C system by applying a
phase operator Zx to it, depending on some bit x. If she is then
able to transmit the A′ system through the channel NA′→B
and the C and S1 systems through an identity channel, the
resulting channel to Bob is as follows:
WP,B :x→ ωBCS1S2x , (5)
ωBCS1S2x ≡TrE{UA
′→BES1
N [(Z
x)
C |ϕ〉 〈ϕ|CA′S1 (Zx)C ]}.
The notation WP,B indicates that this is a phase (P ) channel to
Bob (B). By including the wiretapper E as well, the channel
acts as follows (where we should subsequently trace over E):
x→ (Zx)C UA′→BES2N |ϕ〉CA
′S1
=
1√
2
∑
z
(−1)xz |z〉C |ψz〉BES1S2 . (6)
The symmetric Holevo information of this amplitude channel
WP,B is equal to I (WP,B) ≡ I (X;BCS1S2)η , where the
mutual information is computed using the following state:
ηXBCS1S2 ≡ 1
2
∑
x
|x〉 〈x|X ⊗ ωBCS1S2x . (7)
Although it is not immediately obvious, the phase channel
WP,B is useful in constructing polar codes for private classical
communication. Its importance stems from the fact that it is
intimately related to the amplitude channel from the sender
to the wiretapper Eve, via an uncertainty relation [5]. Indeed,
consider the channel from Alice’s input bit z to the wiretapper:
WA,E : z → NA′→E(ρA′z ), (8)
where NA′→E is the channel that results from tracing over
Bob’s system after applying the wiretap channel NA′→BE .
The notation WA,E indicates that this channel is an amplitude
(A) channel to Eve (E). The symmetric Holevo information
of this channel is equal to I (WA,E) ≡ I (Z;E)ξ.
The important uncertainty relation between the channels
WP,B and WA,E is then as follows:
I (WP,B) + I (WA,E) = 1, (9)
which is a special case of Lemma 2 from Ref. [13]. We
interpret the above uncertainty relation as “if the phase channel
to Bob is nearly perfect, then the amplitude channel to Eve
must be nearly useless and vice versa.”
The above uncertainty relation then enables us to construct
a reliable and strongly secure polar coding scheme for sending
private classical data. As outlined in Section II-C our scheme
has the sender transmit private information bits through the
synthesized channels (in the polar coding sense) that are
nearly perfect in both amplitude and phase for Bob. The fact
that these synthesized amplitude channels are nearly perfect
guarantees that Bob will be able to recover these bits reliably,
and that these synthesized phase channels are nearly perfect
for Bob guarantees that Eve will be able to recover only a
negligibly small amount of information about the bits sent
through them, due to the above uncertainty relation.
Partitioning the synthesized channels according to amplitude
and phase for Bob, rather than according to amplitude for Bob
and amplitude for Eve as in Refs. [1], [4], has the advantage
that the scheme achieves the symmetric private information
rate for all quantum wiretap channels. Moreover, we can
prove that the secret key consumption rate vanishes for all
degradable quantum channels, and we can furthermore provide
an additional sufficient condition for when the secret key rate
of the polar coding scheme vanishes.
B. Channel Polarization
Ref. [3] demonstrated how to construct synthesized versions
of W , by channel combining and splitting [2]. The synthesized
channels W (i)N are of the following form:
W
(i)
N : ui → ρU
i−1
1 B
N
(i),ui
, (10)
ρ
Ui−11 B
N
(i),ui
≡
∑
ui−11
1
2i−1
∣∣ui−11 〉 〈ui−11 ∣∣Ui−11 ⊗ ρBNui1 , (11)
ρB
N
ui1
≡
∑
uNi+1
1
2N−i
ρB
N
uNGN
, ρB
N
xN ≡ ρB1x1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρBNxN ,
where GN is Arikan’s encoding circuit matrix built from
classical CNOT and permutation gates. If the channel is
classical, then these states are diagonal in the computational
basis, and the above states correspond to the distributions for
the synthesized channels [2]. The interpretation of W (i)N is
that it is the channel “seen” by the input ui if the previ-
ous bits ui−11 are available and if the future bits u
N
i+1 are
randomized. This motivates the development of a quantum
successive cancellation decoder [3] that attempts to distinguish
ui = 0 from ui = 1 by adaptively exploiting the results of
previous measurements and quantum hypothesis tests for each
bit decision.
The synthesized channels W (i)N polarize, in the sense that
some become nearly perfect for classical data transmission
while others become nearly useless. To prove this result, one
can model the channel splitting and combining process as a
random birth process [2], [3], and one can demonstrate that the
induced random birth processes corresponding to the channel
parameters I(W (i)N ) and F (W
(i)
N ) are martingales that con-
verge almost surely to zero-one valued random variables in the
limit of many recursions. The following theorem characterizes
the rate with which the channel polarization effect takes hold
[14], [3], and it is useful in proving statements about the
performance of polar codes for cq channels:
Theorem 1: Given a binary input cq channel W and any
β < 1/2, it holds that limn→∞ PrI{
√
F (W
(I)
2n ) < 2
−2nβ} =
I (W ), where n indicates the level of recursion for the
encoding, W (I)2n is a random variable characterizing the I
th
split channel, and F (W (I)2n ) is the fidelity of that channel.
Assuming knowledge of the good and bad channels, one can
then construct a coding scheme based on the channel polar-
ization effect, by dividing the synthesized channels according
to the following polar coding rule:
GN (W,β) ≡
{
i ∈ [N ] :
√
F (W
(i)
N ) < 2
−Nβ}, (12)
and BN (W,β) ≡ [N ] \ GN (W,β), so that GN (W,β) is
the set of “good” channels and BN (W,β) is the set of
“bad” channels. The sender then transmits the information bits
through the good channels and “frozen” bits through the bad
ones. A helpful assumption for error analysis is that the frozen
bits are chosen uniformly at random such that the sender
and receiver both have access to these frozen bits. Ref. [3]
provided an explicit construction of a quantum successive
cancellation decoder that has an error probability equal to
o(2−N
β
)—let {Λ(uAc )uA } denote the corresponding decoding
positive operator-valued measure (POVM) [9], with uA the
information bits and uAc the frozen bits.
For our polar coding scheme for private communication,
we can imagine that the classical bits fed into the encoder
are encoded into the classical states |0〉 and |1〉 and that the
encoder is a coherent, quantum version of Arikan’s encoder
[2], meaning that the gates are quantum CNOTs and per-
mutations (i.e., the same encoder as in Refs. [6], [4]). This
perspective is helpful in our subsequent analysis of the phase
channels, though it need not be the case in practice—the
scheme will work perfectly well if the bits are just classical bits
and the encoder is Arikan’s classical encoder. When sending
amplitude-basis classical information through the encoder and
channels, the effect is to induce synthesized channels W (i)A,N
as described above. Theorem 1 states that the fraction of
amplitude-good channels (according to the criterion in (12))
is equal to I (Z;B)ξ.
We now consider how the encoder induces synthesized
channels for the phase-basis classical information. It is im-
portant to keep in mind for our development in this paper that
these channels are merely virtual—we just consider them in
order to relate back to the amplitude channels to Eve via an
uncertainty relation (this uncertainty relation will be a slightly
modified version of that in (9)). The benefit of this approach
is that we can broaden the results of Refs. [1], [4] and make
sharper statements about the code’s secret key consumption.
Proceeding similarly to Ref. [6], [15], the same encoding
operation leads to channel polarization for the phase channel
WP,B as well. Suppose Alice modulates her halves of the
entangled pairs as in the definition of WP , but then inputs
them to the coherent encoder before sending them via the
channel to Bob. The result is
1√
2N
∑
zN∈{0,1}N
(−1)xN ·zN |ψzNGN 〉B
NENSN1 S
N
2
∣∣zN〉CN ,
whose BNSN1 S
N
2 C
N marginal state is simply
UC
N
E ω
BNSN1 S
N
2 C
N
xNGTN
U†C
N
E , where UE denotes the polar
encoder. Here we have used the fact that the matrix
corresponding to GN is invertible. Thus, the coherent encoder
also induces synthesized channels W (i)P,N using the encoding
matrix GTN instead of GN , modulo the additional UE acting
on CN . Theorem 1 states that the fraction of phase-good
channels to Bob (according to the criterion in (12)) is
approximately equal to I (X;BCS1S2)η .
Note that the classical side information for the W (i)P,N
is different from that in (10) because the direction of all
CNOT gates is flipped due to the transpose of GN when
acting on phase variables. This means means that the ith
synthesized phase channel W (i)P,N is such that all of the future
bits xN · · ·xi+1 are available to help in decoding bit xi while
all of the previous bits xi−1 · · ·x1 are randomized. (This is
the same as described in Ref. [6] for Pauli channels.)
A clear advantage of the current approach over the previous
construction from Ref. [4] is that Theorem 1 directly applies to
the phase-good channels with the “goodness criterion” given
by (12). Ref. [4] considered the amplitude channels to Eve
(rather than the phase-good channels to Bob), and it seemed
only possible to prove polarization results for quantum wiretap
channels in which the amplitude channel to Eve is classical.
Our approach here overcomes this difficulty by appealing to
Theorem 1 directly for polarization and later relating the phase
channels to Bob and the amplitude channels to Eve via an
uncertainty relation (similar to the approach from Ref. [15]).
C. Private Polar Coding Scheme
We can now specify our polar coding scheme. Divide
the synthesized cq amplitude channels W (i)A,B,N into sets
GN (WA,B , β) and BN (WA,B , β) according to (12), and sim-
ilarly, divide the synthesized cq phase channels W (i)P,B,N into
sets GN (WP,B , β) and BN (WP,B , β), where β < 1/2. The
synthesized channels correspond to particular inputs to the
encoding operation, and thus the set of all inputs divides into
four groups: those that are good for both the amplitude and
phase variable, those that are good for amplitude and bad for
phase, bad for amplitude and good for phase, and those that are
bad for both variables. We denote these channels as follows:
A ≡ GN (WA,B , β) ∩ GN (WP,B , β) ,
X ≡ GN (WA,B , β) ∩ BN (WP,B , β) ,
Z ≡ BN (WA,B , β) ∩ GN (WP,B , β) ,
B ≡ BN (WA,B , β) ∩ BN (WP,B , β) .
Our polar coding scheme for private classical communi-
cation has the sender transmit information bits through the
inputs in A, random bits through the inputs in X , frozen
bits through the inputs in Z , and halves of secret key bits
through the inputs in B. It is straightforward to prove that
the net rate of private classical communication (|A| − |B|) /N
is equal to the symmetric private information I (Z;B)ξ −
I (Z;E)ξ by observing that the fraction of amplitude-good
channels is I (Z;B)ξ, the fraction of phase-good channels
is I (X;BCS1S2)η , and exploiting the uncertainty relation
I (X;BCS1S2)η = 1− I (Z;E)ξ from (9). A detailed proof
is similar to the proof given in Appendix A of Ref. [15].
We should stress that our consideration of the phase chan-
nels in this paper is only necessary in order to compute the
index sets A, X , Z , and B. The decoder in the next section
does not make explicit use of these phase channels—they
only arise in our security analysis, where we appeal to an
entropic uncertainty relation in order to guarantee security of
the scheme. This is in contrast to our polar coding scheme
for sending quantum information [15], in which the decoder
makes explicit use of the phase channels.
D. Reliability and Security Analysis
First, it is straightforward to prove that the code has good
reliability, by appealing to the results from Ref. [3]. That is,
there exists a POVM {Λ(uB)uA,uX } such that
Pr{ÛC 6= UC} ≤
√
2
∑
i∈C
√
F (W
(i)
A,B,N ) = o
(
2−
1
2N
β
)
.
where C ≡ A ∪ X . This POVM is the quantum successive
cancellation decoder established in Ref. [3]. The quantum
successive cancellation decoder operates exactly as before, but
it needs to decode both the information bits in A and the
randomized bits in X . It also exploits the frozen bits in Z and
the secret key bits in B to help with decoding. This decoder has
an efficient implementation if the channel to Bob is classical
[2]. This is the case for the amplitude damping channel and
any Pauli channel, for example.
We now prove that strong security, in the sense of Ref. [1],
holds for our polar coding scheme.
Theorem 2: For sufficiently large N , the private polar cod-
ing scheme given above satisfies the following strong security
criterion: I
(
UA;EN
)
= o(2−
1
2N
β
).
Proof: Consider that
I
(
UA;EN
)
=
∑
i∈A
I
(
Ui;E
N |UA−i
)
=
∑
i∈A
I
(
Ui;E
NUA−i
)
≤
∑
i∈A
I
(
Ui;E
NU i−11
)
=
∑
i∈A
I(W
(i)
A,E,N )
The first equality is from the chain rule for quantum mutual
information and by defining A−i to be the indices in A
preceding i. The second equality follows from the assumption
that the bits in UA−i are chosen uniformly at random. The first
inequality is from quantum data processing. The third equality
is from the definition of the synthesized channels W (i)A,E,N .
Continuing, we have
≤
∑
i∈A
√
1− F (W (i)A,E,N ) ≤
∑
i∈A
√
1− (1− 2F (W (i)P,B,N )
1
2 )2
≤
∑
i∈A
√
4
√
F (W
(i)
P,B,N ) ≤ 2
∑
i∈A
√
2−Nβ = o
(
2−
1
2N
β
)
.
The first inequality is from Proposition 1 in Ref. [3]. The
second inequality follows from a fidelity uncertainty relation√
F (W
(i)
A,E,N ) + 2
√
F (W
(i)
P,B,N ) ≥ 1, (13)
proved in Appendix C of Ref. [15]. The fourth inequality
follows from the definition of the set A.
III. VANISHING SECRET-KEY RATE
The rate of secret key required by our polar coding scheme
vanishes whenever the quantum wiretap channel NA′→BE is
degradable, meaning that there exists some degrading map
DB→E that allows the legitimate receiver to simulate the
output of the wiretapper: DB→E ◦ NA′→B = NA′→E . This
condition holds for many channels of interest such as the
amplitude damping channel and the dephasing channel.
The argument proceeds similarly to the argument in
Ref. [15]. The argument there demonstrates that the entan-
glement consumption rate of a quantum polar code vanishes
for degradable channels (this argument in turn is similar to
the original argument in Ref. [1]). We merely highlight the
argument and point the interested reader to Appendix C of
Ref. [15] for the details. From the fidelity uncertainty relation
in (13), we know that the phase-good channels to Bob should
be amplitude-“very bad” to Eve, in the sense that√
F (W
(i)
P,B,N ) < 2
−Nβ =⇒
√
F (W
(i)
A,E,N ) > 1− 2 · 2−N
β
.
From degradability, we also know that the doubly-bad chan-
nels in B are amplitude-bad channels to Eve (if they are bad
for Bob, then they are worse for Eve.). These observations
imply that the phase-good channels to Bob, the doubly-bad
channels to Bob, and the amplitude-good channels to Eve are
disjoint sets. From Theorem 1, the sum rate of the phase-good
channels to Bob and the amplitude-good channels to Eve is
equal to I(WP,B) + I(WA,E) = 1 as N →∞. Thus, the rate
of the doubly-bad set is zero in the same limit.
The theorem below provides another sufficient condition for
when our private polar code has a vanishing secret key rate.
The argument proceeds along the lines given in Section 7.1 of
Ref. [6], with the fidelity replacing the Bhattacharya parameter.
We provide a proof in Appendix B for completeness.
Theorem 3: If the following inequality holds, then the pri-
vate polar coding scheme has a vanishing secret key rate:√
F (WA,B) +
√
F (WP,B) < 1.
F (WA,B) and F (WP,B) are the fidelities of the amplitude
channel in (1) and the phase channel in (5), respectively.
It is our suspicion that channels satisfying the above con-
dition do not require any secret key at all, but we have
not been able to prove it (we discuss this point further in
Appendix B). We note that the above theorem provides a
similar sufficient condition for the quantum polar codes from
Ref. [15] to determine if the codes there have a vanishing rate
of entanglement consumption.
In Appendix C, we compute
√
F (WA,B) +
√
F (WP,B)
for several example channels, including the binary symmetric
wiretap channel from Ref. [1], the erasure wiretap channel,
and the amplitude damping channel. We find that the secret
key rate vanishes for a wide range of interesting parameters.
IV. CONCLUSION
Building on the general approach from Ref. [13], we have
constructed a polar coding scheme for private classical com-
munication over a quantum wiretap channel which achieves
the symmetric private information rate. By considering the
associated classical amplitude and phase channels of the
wiretap channel, we are able to demonstrate that the scheme is
both reliable and strongly secure. Indeed, the reliability of non-
private polar coding is sufficient, as the strong security of the
private protocol follows from the reliability of the phase chan-
nel coding. Additionally, we have shown that the secret-key
consumption rate vanishes for all degradable quantum wiretap
channels or channels satisfying a simple fidelity criterion. As
classical wiretap channels are a special form of quantum wire-
tap channels, all of our results apply to them as well. It would
be interesting to find an argument ensuring reliability and
strong security of the scheme which relies only on a classical
description of the wiretap channel. Further important open
questions include whether there is an efficient implementation
of the quantum successive cancellation decoder used here, if
there is a fast algorithm for determining the good and bad
channels, and if the condition in Theorem 3 implies that the
codes require no secret key at all.
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APPENDIX A
CLASSICAL WIRETAP CHANNELS AS QUANTUM WIRETAP CHANNELS
Suppose that p (y, z|x) is a classical wiretap channel such that x is the input and y and z are the outputs for the legitimate
receiver and the wiretapper, respectively. Then we can embed the random variables X , Y , and Z into quantum systems, so
that the resulting wiretap channel has the following action on an arbitrary input state ρ:
NA′→BEC (ρ) ≡
∑
x,y,z
〈x| ρ |x〉 p (y, z|x) |y〉 〈y|B ⊗ |z〉 〈z|E . (14)
The physical interpretation of the above channel is that it first measures the input system in the orthonormal basis {|x〉 〈x|}
(ensuring that the input is effectively classical) and prepares the classical states |y〉B and |z〉E for Bob and Eve with probability
p (y, z|x). One can check that the Kraus operators [9] for this classical channel are{√
p (y, z|x)
(
|y〉B ⊗ |z〉E
)
〈x|A′
}
x,y,z
.
Thus, by a standard construction [9], an isometric extension of this classical wiretap channel acts as follows on a pure state
input |ψ〉:
UA
′→BES2
NC |ψ〉 =
∑
x,y,z
√
p (y, z|x)
(
|y〉B ⊗ |z〉E
)
〈x|A′ |ψ〉 ⊗ |x, y, z〉S2 ,
so that tracing over system S2 recovers the action of the original channel in (14).1
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
As described in Section II-B, one can prove that channel polarization takes hold by considering the channel splitting and
combining process as a random birth process {Wn : n ≥ 0} (with the channel choice picked by some IID Bernoulli process
{Bn : n ≥ 1} and setting W0 = W ). One can then consider the induced birth process
{Fn : n ≥ 0} ≡ {
√
F (Wn) : n ≥ 0}
for the fidelity channel parameter. The inequalities (26-27) from Ref. [3] (an extension of Arikan’s inequalities [2]) demonstrate
that the following extremal process {F ′n : n ≥ 0} bounds the actual channel process {Fn : n ≥ 0}:
F ′n+1 =
{
F ′2n if Bn = 0
2F ′n − F ′2n if Bn = 1 ,
a relation which can be written more symmetrically as
F ′n+1 = F
′2
n if Bn = 0,
1− F ′n+1 = (1− F ′n)2 if Bn = 1. (15)
From now on, we make abbreviations such as {Fn} = {Fn : n ≥ 0} in order to simplify the notation.
The extremal process above has the nice property [14, Observation 4 (ii)] (see the arXiv version) that for every realization
{bn} of the process {Bn} (and thus for every realization {f ′n} of {F ′n}) there exists a particular initial threshold value F ′th ({bn})
such that either
lim
n→∞ f
′
n = 0 if F
′
0 < F
′
th ({bn}) ,
or
lim
n→∞ f
′
n = 1 if F
′
0 ≥ F ′th ({bn}) .
(Note that F ′0 is deterministic and is the initial value of the process.)
We can denote the respective fidelity processes for the amplitude and phase channels in our coding scheme as
{
FAn
}
and{
FPn
}
and the respective random birth processes as
{
BAn
}
and
{
BPn
}
. Also, let
{
FA′n
}
and
{
FP ′n
}
denote the corresponding
extremal processes. The important observation made in Ref. [6] is that the process
{
FPn
}
makes the opposite choice of channel
at each step of the birth process because the phase encoder is the reverse of the amplitude encoder. That is, it holds for every
n and for every realization
{
bAn
}
and
{
bPn
}
that
bPn = 1− bAn .
1The square root of a probability might seem strange at first glance when appearing in an evolution, but it is in fact quite natural in quantum information
theory, being interpreted physically as a probability amplitude.
Thus, we can write BPn = 1 − BAn , so that BPn is completely determined by BAn . The extremal amplitude channel process{
FA′n
}
is already of the form in (15), and we can consider the extremal phase process as
{
1− FP ′n
}
in order for it to have
this same form. Thus, a realization {fA′n } of the extremal amplitude channel process
{
FA′n
}
converges to one if
FA′0 ≥ F ′th({bAn }),
and a realization {1− fP ′n } of the extremal phase process
{
1− FP ′n
}
converges to zero if
1− FP ′0 < F ′th({bAn }),
implying that
{
fP ′n
}
converges to one if
FP ′0 > 1− F ′th({bAn }).
Thus, the sum process
{
FA′n + F
P ′
n
}
converges to two if
FA′0 + F
P ′
0 ≥ F ′th({bAn }) + 1− F ′th({bAn })
= 1. (16)
The above bound is a universal, sufficient lower bound for the sum process to converge to two, that holds regardless of the
threshold value F ′th({bAn }) for a particular realization {bAn }. It follows that a given realization
{
fAn + f
P
n
}
of the actual sum
process
{
FAn + F
P
n
}
can only converge to two when (16) holds because we set FA
′
0 = F
A
0 and the extremal process bounds
the actual process (note that some realizations might converge to one or zero as well). If a realization
{
fAn + f
P
n
}
of the sum
process
{
FAn + F
P
n
}
converges to two, then this implies that the set B is non-empty, i.e., the code will require some secret
key bits. So, if the condition in the statement of the theorem holds, no realization of the sum process can ever converge to
two, and the code will not require any secret key bits.
The above argument only holds in the asymptotic limit of many recursions of the encoding such that the channel polarization
effect takes hold (where all synthesized channels are polarized to be completely perfect or useless). That is, the argument does
not apply whenever there is a finite number of recursions—in this case, if the number of recursions is large enough, then a
large fraction of synthesized channels polarize according to some tolerance, but there is always a small fraction that have not
polarized. Thus, we can only conclude that the above proof applies in the limit of many recursions and that the rate of secret
key consumption vanishes in this limit. It is an open question to adapt the above argument to the finite case, but we suspect
that some form of it holds in this regime.
APPENDIX C
EXAMPLE CHANNELS
In this appendix, we evaluate the condition from Theorem 3 for several examples, including the independent binary symmetric
wiretap channel model from Ref. [1], the erasure wiretap channel, and the amplitude damping channel. For many of these
cases, we find that the resulting polar codes have a vanishing secret key rate for a wide range of parameters.
A. Binary Symmetric Wiretap Channel
Suppose that the channel to Bob is a binary symmetric channel with flip probability pB and the channel to Eve is an
independent binary symmetric channel with flip probability pE . The symmetric private information for this channel is equal to
(1−H2 (pB))− (1−H2 (pE)) = H2 (pE)−H2 (pB) ,
which is only positive whenever pB < pE . The conditional distribution p (y, z|x) for this channel is just
p (y, z|x) = (pB)x+y (1− pB)x+y+1 (pE)x+z (1− pE)x+z+1 , (17)
where Alice inputs x, Bob receives output y, Eve receives output z, and y, z, x ∈ {0, 1}. Observe that the above channel
factorizes as
p (y, z|x) = p (y|x) p (z|x) ,
where
p (y|x) = (pB)x+y (1− pB)x+y+1 ,
p (z|x) = (pE)x+z (1− pE)x+z+1 .
Since the amplitude channel to Bob in this case is just a binary symmetric channel with flip probability pB , the root fidelity√
F (WA,B) just reduces to the classical Bhattacharya parameter:√
F (WA,B) = 2
√
pB (1− pB).
We now need to compute the fidelity for the phase channel to Bob. Since Alice inputs classical states |z〉 to the amplitude
channel, the states |ψz〉 in (4) are just equal to |z〉 (there is no shield system S1). This implies that the quantum input for the
phase channel is of the form
Zx
′ 1√
2
∑
z′
|z′〉C |z′〉A′ = 1√
2
∑
z′
(−1)x′·z′ |z′〉C |z′〉A′ ,
if x′ is the input bit. The isometric extension of this classical wiretap channel is then just∑
x,y,z
√
p (y, z|x)
(
|y〉B ⊗ |z〉E
)
〈x|A′ ⊗ |x, y, z〉S2 ,
with p (y, z|x) given by (17), so that the action on the above input state is
x′ → 1√
2
∑
x,y,z,z′
(−1)x′·z′
√
p (y, z|x) |y〉B |z〉E |z′〉C 〈x|z′〉A′ ⊗ |x, y, z〉S2
=
1√
2
∑
x,y,z
(−1)x′·x
√
p (y, z|x) |y〉B |z〉E |x〉C ⊗ |x, y, z〉S2 .
To simplify things, we will write p (x) = 1/2, giving
x′ →
∑
x,y,z
(−1)x′·x
√
p (y, z|x) p (x) |y〉B |z〉E |x〉C ⊗ |x, y, z〉S2
Tracing over the E system then gives the phase channel to Bob:
TrE
 ∑
x,y,z,x′′,y′′,z′′
(−1)x′·x (−1)x′·x′′
√
p (y, z|x) p (x) p (y′′, z′′|x′′) p (x′′) |y〉 〈y′′|B |z〉 〈z′′|E |x〉 〈x′′|C ⊗ |x, y, z〉 〈x′′, y′′, z′′|S2

=
∑
x,y,z,x′′,y′′
(−1)x′·(x+x′′)
√
p (y, z|x) p (x) p (y′′, z|x′′) p (x′′) |y〉 〈y′′|B ⊗ |x〉 〈x′′|C ⊗ |x, y, z〉 〈x′′, y′′, z|S2
=
∑
x,y,z,x′′,y′′
(−1)x′·(x+x′′)
√
p (y|x) p (z|x) p (x) p (y′′|x′′) p (z|x′′) p (x′′) |y〉 〈y′′|B ⊗ |x〉 〈x′′|C ⊗ |x, y, z〉 〈x′′, y′′, z|S2
=
∑
x,y,z,x′′,y′′
(−1)x′·(x+x′′)
√
p (y|x) p (x|z) p (z) p (y′′|x′′) p (x′′|z) p (z) |y〉 〈y′′|B ⊗ |x〉 〈x′′|C ⊗ |x, y, z〉 〈x′′, y′′, z|S2
We can then factorize the above state as follows:
ωBCSXSY SZx′ ≡
∑
z
p (z) |χz,x′〉 〈χz,x′ |BCSXSY ⊗ |z〉 〈z|SZ ,
where
|χz,x′〉BCSXSY ≡ 1√
2
∑
x,y
(−1)x′·x
√
p (y|x) p (x|z) |y〉B |x〉C |x〉SX |y〉SY .
Noting that p (z) = 1/2, we now compute the fidelity
√
F (WP,B) as√
F (WP,B) =
√
F
(
ωBCSXSY SZ0 , ω
BCSXSY SZ
1
)
=
∑
z
1
2
√
F (χz,0, χz,1)
=
∑
z
1
2
|〈χz,0|χz,1〉|
= |pE − 1/2| ,
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Fig. 1. The parameters pB and pE correspond to bit flip probabilities in the binary symmetric wiretap channel. Below the blue line is the region where the
symmetric private information is positive. Below the green line is the region for when the secret key rate of the code vanishes according to Theorem 3. The
result is that the polar code has a vanishing secret key rate for a wide range of interesting parameters pB and pE .
where the last line follows from
|〈χz,0|χz,1〉| = 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x,y,x′′,y′′
(−1)x
√
p (y′′|x′′) p (x′′|z) p (y|x) p (x|z) 〈y′′| |y〉B 〈x′′| |x〉C 〈x′′| |x〉SX 〈y′′| |y〉SY
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x,y
(−1)x p (y|x) p (x|z)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x
(−1)x p (x|z)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x
(−1)x (pE)x+z (1− pE)x+z+1
∣∣∣∣∣
= |pE − 1/2| .
The relation p (x|z) = p (z|x) follows because p (x) = p (z) = 1/2.
Thus, from Theorem 3, the sufficient condition for the wiretap channel in (17) to have a vanishing secret key rate is just
2
√
pB (1− pB) + |pE − 1/2| < 1.
If we assume that pE < 1/2, then this reduces to
2
√
pB (1− pB) < 1/2 + pE .
Figure 1 provides a plot of two bounds: a bound for when the symmetric private information is positive and bound for when
the polar code has a vanishing secret key rate. We find that the secret key rate vanishes for a wide range of parameters.
B. Erasure Channel
An erasure channel transmits the input bit with probability 1−  and provides an erasure symbol e to the receiver (different
from 0 or 1) with probability . A simple model for a channel to the wiretapper is to give the input bit to the wiretapper
whenever the receiver gets the erasure symbol (thus, the channel to the wiretapper is an erasure channel with erasure probability
1− ).
It turns out that this model is equivalent to the quantum erasure channel:
ρ→ (1− ) ρ+  |e〉 〈e| ,
for which it is well known that the complementary channel is just
ρ→ ρ+ (1− ) |e〉 〈e| ,
so that this channel is equivalent to the wiretap channel mentioned above. Both the quantum and private capacities of this
channel are equal to 1− 2.
The amplitude channel to Bob is just an erasure channel with erasure probability . We now consider the phase channel to
Bob:
x→ N (Zx |Φ〉 〈Φ|Zx) = Zx |Φ〉 〈Φ|Zx + (1− )pi ⊗ |e〉 〈e| ,
where pi is the maximally mixed state. It is clear that the above channel is also just an erasure channel with erasure probability
 because Bob can perform the measurement {|0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1| , |e〉 〈e|} on the second qubit to determine if he received the
state. If he does receive it, he can then perform a Bell measurement to retrieve the bit x.
Since the root fidelity of an erasure channel is just , the condition from Theorem 3 for vanishing secret key rate just reduces
to
2 < 1,
which is satisfied for all erasure probabilities  for which the private information is positive.
C. Amplitude Damping Channel
The last example of a channel that we study is the amplitude damping channel. This channel models photon loss when
transmitting a state in the zero or single-photon subspace over a pure-loss bosonic channel (a beamsplitter with transmissivity
η). The Kraus operators for this channel are
A0 ≡
√
1− η |0〉 〈1| ,
A1 ≡ |0〉 〈0|+√η |1〉 〈1| ,
so that the evolution of an input qubit is
ρ→ A0ρA†0 +A1ρA†1.
This channel has a positive private capacity whenever η > 1/2. If η ≤ 1/2, then the majority of the output is going to the
wiretapper (or the environment of the channel) and so there is not any positive private capacity for this parameter range.
The amplitude channel to Bob is
0→ A0 |0〉 〈0|A†0 +A1 |0〉 〈0|A†1 = |0〉 〈0| ,
1→ A0 |1〉 〈1|A†0 +A1 |1〉 〈1|A†1 = (1− η) |0〉 〈0|+ η |1〉 〈1| .
Thus, the fidelity for this amplitude channel is
√
1− η.
Now consider the phase channel:
x→ N (Zx |Φ〉 〈Φ|Zx) ,
where |Φ〉 is the Bell state. Analyzing for this case gives
(1− η) |0〉 〈1| (Zx |Φ〉 〈Φ|Zx) |1〉 〈0|+
(
|0〉 〈0|+
√
1− γ |1〉 〈1|
)
(Zx |Φ〉 〈Φ|Zx)
(
|0〉 〈0|+
√
1− γ |1〉 〈1|
)
We handle the first term:
(1− η) |0〉 〈1| (Zx |Φ〉 〈Φ|Zx) |1〉 〈0| = 1− η
2
|0〉 〈1| (|00〉 〈00|+ (−1)x |11〉 〈00|+ (−1)x |00〉 〈11|+ |11〉 〈11|) |1〉 〈0|
=
1− η
2
|10〉 〈10|
We handle the second term:
(|0〉 〈0|+√η |1〉 〈1|) (Zx |Φ〉 〈Φ|Zx) (|0〉 〈0|+√η |1〉 〈1|)
=
1
2
(|0〉 〈0|+√η |1〉 〈1|) (|00〉 〈00|+ (−1)x |11〉 〈00|+ (−1)x |00〉 〈11|+ |11〉 〈11|) (|0〉 〈0|+√η |1〉 〈1|)
=
1
2
(|00〉 〈00|+ (−1)x√η |11〉 〈00|+ (−1)x |00〉 〈11|+√η |11〉 〈11|) (|0〉 〈0|+√η |1〉 〈1|)
=
1
2
(|00〉 〈00|+ (−1)x√η |11〉 〈00|+ (−1)x√η |00〉 〈11|+ η |11〉 〈11|)
Adding the two terms gives
1
2
(|00〉 〈00|+ (−1)x√η |11〉 〈00|+ (−1)x√η |00〉 〈11|+ η |11〉 〈11|) + 1− η
2
|10〉 〈10|
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Fig. 2. A comparison of the quantity
√
F (WA,B) +
√
F (WP,B) from Theorem 3 and 1 for various transmissivities η of the amplitude damping channel.
The result is that a polar code has a vanishing secret key rate for most η.
which has the following matrix representation in the computational basis:
1
2 0 0
1
2 (−1)x
√
η
0 0 0 0
0 0 1−η2 0
1
2 (−1)x
√
η 0 0 η2
 .
We numerically compute the fidelity for the phase channel, and the plot in Figure 2 shows all of the damping parameters
which meet the condition from Theorem 3. The result is that the polar has a vanishing secret key rate for most transmissivities η.
